Posts Tagged ‘Red Sox’

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How Seibu spent the money

May 4, 2009

Here’s the NY Times account of how the Seibu Lions spent the $51.1 million that they received from the Red Sox for Daisuke Matsuzaka‘s posting rights. Looks like most of the money was very well spent. (They won the Japan Series and renovated the stadium.)

Update: I forgot to mention, pay special attention to the money dedicated to upgrading the stadium toilets!

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Jonathan of all (van) Trades

May 1, 2009

During last night’s disembowelment of the Red Sox by the Tampa Bay Rays, Terry Francona made an unusual move. Javier Lopez was getting touched up, and the bullpen was depleted after no days off and several extra-inning games against the Indians and (previously) the Yankees. Francona wanted to preserve Lopez, his “lefty specialist”, so he sent Lopez to right field, and asked minor-leaguer-for-life Jonathan van Every to pitch.

(Pitch f/x was broken for most of Van Every’s outing, so we didn’t get to watch much of his motion/pitch selection, etc. It looked to me like he was just throwing a lot of high and outside pitches “not-slowballs” in the low 80s.)

I had the Rays’ broadcast of the game at home, and the announcer brought up a really good point. Some viewers may have thought that Francona’s move was embarrassing to Lopez, and was meant to show him up. The broadcaster (who sounded a lot like Fox’s Kevin Kennedy, but I thought he was doing Dodger games) made the point that Francona’s move was designed to protect Lopez’ arm for a later night that weekend where Lopez might be able to contribute to a game that wasn’t already decided by a ten-plus run margin. Javier Lopez may have suffered the indignity of being replaced but not pulled (and having to run down a double that Van Every allowed), but he would live to fight again later that weekend.

Now if only we could figure out why Theo Epstein and Terry Francona keep relying on Javier Lopez to fight for them.

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SABRtooth on Bleacher Report

February 6, 2009

Your author wrote one of Bleacher Report’s pre-season preview articles, discussing five questions facing the Boston Red Sox.

The hot stove has been quite cool in the past couple weeks. We’ll return with preseason previews next week as pitchers and catchers report to their teams in the Cactus and Grapefruit Leagues.

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Varitek and Boras

January 26, 2009

After leaving him (fairly deservedly) out in the cold for months, the Red Sox have decided to make Jason Varitek an unconventional offer. The deal, as reported by Tony Massarotti of the Boston Globe, would pay Varitek one year at five million, with two 2010 options: a club option at five million, and a player option at three.

The idea here is probably to gradually reduce Varitek’s playing time. Peter Gammons mentioned this weekend that only six catchers have ever caught over 100 games at age 37, and the Red Sox are not the kind of team to try to make Varitek number seven. If Varitek is OK with a reduced role, he can come back with the player option. If Varitek defies his clear aging trend and decline in performance, then the Red Sox can bring him back. 

The offer smells like a sympathy/public relations move. While the Red Sox did not have terribly compelling catching options in-house between Josh Bard and George Kottaras, those two did have the virtue of being cheap. Varitek, even if he plays 2009 like the average of 2006-2008 seasons, does not figure to perform far above the level of Bard, and a return to form would be blindly optimistic.

It’s not as if Varitek has other options. Since he and Scott Boras stupidly turned down salary arbitration (which likely would have netted Varitek at least $10 million), no team has been willing to take a look at Varitek, for fear of losing their first-round draft pick as compensation. Knowing that teams were unwilling to pay for Varitek at any price, the Red Sox had no need to give Varitek more than it would take to prevent him from retiring or sitting out the season. Theo Epstein and Co. may have judged five million dollars to be a sum that will bring Varitek back and shields them from being called stingy in the media if Varitek were to refuse, but Epstein has not appeared to care much about media opinion in the past.

Boras (and Varitek) badly misread the market here. In 2004, when  Varitek posted an .872 OPS and was the toast of baseball for managing Boston’s top-flight stable of pitchers to their “curse-breaking” world championship, they had most of  the leverage. Now, after three seasons of poor play and a poor gamble, the Red Sox have all the leverage. The Sox’ deal apparently has a deadline. It would behoove Mr. Boras and Mr. Varitek to swallow their collective pride and accept before the deadline passes.

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Talent Show

January 16, 2009

DD writes:
Wasn’t there an argument that the expansion of the ’90s diluted the MLB talent pool a bit? The glut of still-available, decent-performing free agents speaks more to the economy than anything else, but is it a sign that the league’s talent level is as high as it’s been?

I think the glut of still-available free agents is due to a couple factors. The first of which is baseball’s extremely flawed draft-pick compensation system. Originally conceived to put some friction on the inflation of star salaries and to compensate small- and mid-market teams that could not afford to keep their home-grown superstars, it is now penalizing middle-tier players AND lower-market teams. 

Here’s how the system works. The Elias Sports Bureau ranks the available free agents every year. Players are assigned to three ranking categories (Type A, Type B, and unranked) on the basis of Elias determination of their performance over the past two years. Type A free agents are supposed to represent the cream of the crop at their positional group (middle infielders, corner players, catchers, relievers, etc.), Type B represent above-average players, and unranked players are at the bottom. The rankings are extremely flawed due to their reliance on past rather than future performance, and because the statistics used are often things such as RBI, pitcher wins, batting average, and errors. These stats are often highly context dependent (players on good teams have more RBIs and wins), and so are unreliable predictors of future performance. Because the rankings are based on the past two years, the rankings produce some very poor results. 

Teams that sign a Type A free agent have to give up their first round draft pick, unless it is protected (in the top 15 slots), or it has already been given away to another team by signing a better player. The success of the Rockies, Rays, and Red Sox, and Indians with large home-grown cores supplemented by free agents has forced teams to reconsider the value of their first-round pick. Jason Varitek, who while not a great player is at least serviceable at catcher, can’t get a job because as a Type A free agent, no team is willing to give up a potential home-grown stud in exchange for a year of an old, declining (but still useful) player. Rather than compensate a small-market team losing a star, the system is giving the Red Sox management a very powerful piece of negotiating leverage to prevent Varitek from looking for anything better than the Red Sox low-ball offer.

Now that teams are carefully guarding their draft picks, Type A free agents who are not elite superstars are in a terrible predicament. The only teams with interest in marginal Type A players would be teams that already gave up their first round pick due to a Type A signing, such as the Yankees with Mark Teixeira. I’m not going to argue that the system is designed to bolster the Yankees (the Red Sox have gone on their own Type A spending sprees in the past), but this sort of arrangement prevents a team like Kansas City from using Varitek’s knowledge for a year and gives the Yankees more leverage with certain kinds of free agents. Clearly the intent is not being served.

I suspect a second factor that is amplifying teams reluctance to give up draft picks is a better understanding of defense (and the cost of poor defense). Many of the veteran players we see hanging around on the market (Manny, Abreu, Dunn) are poor defenders. I wonder if teams are placing more weight on defense in their player projections, which might narrow the perceived gap in the projected value between a player such as Bobby Abreu and a young, minimum salary outfielder with a better glove.

So to answer your question in an indirect way, I think the talent level in MLB IS as high as it’s ever been, but that is somewhat difficult to prove with quick-and-dirty math. I think the swarm of unsigned free agents is a symptom of the poor economic outlook and the realization by teams that the contributions of young minimum salary players may provide more bang for the buck than those of aging veterans. Paying for past performance is quite expensive.

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2010 free agent overload?

January 15, 2009

Joel Sherman said on XM’s Home Plate station this morning that there remain over 100 free agents without jobs. If a large number of these players end up going into February without deals, is it possible that most of the remainder get 1-year contracts? Players may want to hold out rather than sign a depressed-value multi-year contract, with the hope that the economy will recover and they can earn more per year in a deal starting in 2010. Could we see a huge number of FAs in 2010 if this signing pattern occurred?

Right now, the big ticket players expected to be on the market in 2010 look to be John Lackey, Matt Holliday, and Jason Bay. Lackey and Bay are negotiating extensions now, and are expected to work out deals with their current teams (Angels and Red Sox). If the economy stays the same or only gets marginally better, Matt Holliday could be in trouble. With the Red Sox out of the market (full outfield with Bay, Ellsbury, and Drew), Holliday and Boras will have a hard time driving up Holliday’s price if the current crop of all-hit, no-field outfielders (Dunn, Abreu, perhaps even Manny) end up trying their luck again on the market. Holliday is probably a more valuable player than these other options, but cheap alternatives will likely prevent teams from paying huge premiums for marginal improvement and increased risk from a multi-year contract.